January 27, 2020.  I’m not against Prince Charles going to Iran, as long as he asks the Iranians in a public appearance there to release the following UK-related hostages:  Kylie Moore-Gilbert, Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe, Morad Tahbaz, Kamal Foroughi, Aras Amiri, Kameel Ahmady, and Anousheh Ashouri.  So, we’ll see if the trip is for pleasure, history, the environment, or if an attempt is made to save the lives of hostages.  “Britain's Prince Charles wants to visit Iran: Sunday Times,” Reuters, January 25, 2020.  See “Iran’s ‘hostage diplomacy': All the known detainees with British links,” The Telegraph, October 5, 2019, for a list and description of these particular hostages.

“Iran's Zarif under fire for saying he’d negotiate with US,” Al-Monitor, January 27, 2020.

“Iran Prepares Site for Satellite Launch That U.S. Links to Ballistic Missiles,” USNWR, January 27, 2020.

“Israel's Channel 12 Says Iran Hackers Targeted Planes Of World Leaders Arriving For Holocaust Memorial,” Radio Farda, January 27, 2020.

“Iran’s Supreme Messaging," Jason Brodsky, The Cipher Brief, January 27, 2020.

“Downing of jet in Iran reveals Islamic Republic’s wider woes,” Jon Gambrell, AP, January 27, 2020.

“Imagery Suggests Iran Is Preparing To Try To Launch A Satellite,” NPR, January 27, 2020.  See also “Iranian Minister: Iran is preparing a site for launching 'a satellite', not ‘a cover for ballistic missile development’,” Ross Burland, FXStreet, Reuters, January 27, 2020.

“Iran's Chief Judge Says 'We Will Meet' Soleimani's Killers, But Not For Talks,” Radio Farda, January 27, 2020.

January 27, 2020.  “Why chameleon cleric Muqtada al Sadr has abandoned Iraqi protesters for Iran,” Tom Rogan, Washington Examiner, January 27, 2020.  So why is al-Sadr switching sides (again)?  It probably partly because he sees an opportunity, partly because the lynchpin Soleimani is removed, and probably due to large amounts of financial corruption.  “In one of the latest developments in Iran's relations with Muqtada al-Sadr, "Following the assassination of General Qasem Soleimani and Hashd al-Sha'bi deputy head Abu-Mahdi al-Muhandis in early January, Iran is following a new plan to strengthen its influence in Iraq in collaboration with Lebanon's Hezbollah," Fararu wrote, adding that Sadr will be one of the pillars of this new arrangement. The report says, "The reason for the change in Iran's policy about its relations with some Iraqi groups were the developments in Iraq during the past months, particularly the events that took place following the assassination of General Qassem Soleimani. During this period, some political figures who were close to Iran or were Iran's allies, including Nuri al-Maliki, Hadi Ameri and Massoud Barzani were not able to play an effective role in guiding or controlling developments in Iraq." They were also not able to play an effective part in the crisis about electing a new Prime Minister after Abd- al-Mahdi's resignation. "Not only these figures and some other groups were not able to shape the developments, but they also were another factor leading to the continuation of the protests," the report said.”  See “Iran Forming New Alliances In Iraq As Al-Sadr Realigns His Policy Toward Tehran,” Radio Farda, January 25, 2020.